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BENCH AND BAR
DISTRICT COURT DIGESTS
How GIVEN: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. -- Wiltes v. Klingensmith, District Court
of the Second Judicial District, Ramsey County, North Dakota,
Douglas B. Heen, District Judge. (January 20, 1960).

ADOPTION -

CONSENT OF PARENT REQUIRED, AND

Mary Ann Klingensmith was a married woman and the mother of
two children. In July, 1957, she separated from her husband and
instituted an action for divorce in Minnesota. Sometime after the
institution of such action, she determined that she was pregnant and
that the father of the child was someone other than her husband.
Due to the effect this might have had on her contemplated custody
of the other children, she stayed with her uncle and aunt in North
Dakota till the birth of the child. At some point during the above
events an arrangement was entered into whereby such child was to
be placed in the custody of Lyle A. Wiltse and his wife. These
people are handicapped by a hearing and speech impairment, and
without success in the past, have attempted to secure a child for
adoption from various agencies. After the birth of the child, the aunt
and a County Judge presented Mrs. Klingensmith with a consent of
adoption which she signed. A few days after her return to Minnesota, Mrs. Klingensmith wrote to the aunt and uncle stating that
she wanted the child returned to her. This request was refused and
the Wiltse's executed a petition for adoption of said child, whereupon Mrs. Klingensmith served upon them a formal revocation of
the consent to adoption and applied for a writ of habeas corpus.
She contended that at the time of the execution of the consent to
adoption, the county judge did not give sufficient explanation of the
legal consequences and that thereby such natural mother was not
fully aware of the implications of her act and can thereby withdraw
her consent.
This action involves the *Tterpretation of N.D. Rev. Code § 141104 (Supp. 1957) which provides that "... an illegitimate child
cannot be adopted without the consent of its mother ... signed before a judge of a court having original jurisdiction in guardianship
proceedings . . . and after the acknowledging officer has explained
to the parent the effect of the consent and has examined the parent
and is satisfied that the consent is voluntary and is freely given . . ."
The court states that legal adoption is purely statutory, and if the
essential requirements of the statute are not complied with, the
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adoption fails. It follows, therefore that North Dakota subscribes
to the proposition that a ccnsent to adoption is jurisdictional and
is the basis of an adoption proceeding, and that in an adoption proceeding such a consent is a condition precedent, compliance with
which is essential to full validity and effect of the decree.
Examination of Section 14-1104 discloses that a parent's consent
to adoption "must" be signed before a proper official who has explained the effect of the consent. For this reason the statute is
mandatory rather than directory only.
This decision is concerned solely with the question of whether the
jurisdictional requirement has been satisfied by execution of a requisite consent in view of cur statutes. From the evidence, it appears that the public official did not give the proper explanation to
the mother; therefore, it is the conclusion of this Court that the
jurisdictional requirement of a requisite consent did not obtain
under these facts as contemplated by N.D. Rev. Code § 14-1104
(Supp. 1957).
Under N.D. Rev. Code § 1.4-0905 (1943), the mother of an illegitimate child is entitled to the custody of such child. The evidence in
the instant case does not indicate in any degree that the natural
mother has abandoned or abused the child, and there is no showing
that the natural mother is presently unfit or presently immoral, nor
that she is unable to properly care for the child. In North Dakota
a Writ of Habeas Corpus is ir the nature of an equitable action and
in determining the custody of a child the paramount consideration
is the child's welfare. Accordingly, it is the conclusion of ths Court
that the child shall be returned and restored to the custody and
control of her natural mother.
The proposed adopton is denied, and the writ of habeas corpus
is granted.
EQUITY -

SPECIFIC PERFOR-ANCE OF ,DECEDENT'S ORAL AGREEMENT

- Morkert v. Morkert, District Court
of the Second Judicial District, Benson County, North Dakota,
Douglas B. Heen, District Judge. (December 12, 1959).
TO DEVISE REAL PROPERTY.

Plaintiff, being a nephew and therefore not an heir of his deceased uncle under the law of succession, insituted this action
against the heirs of the decedent for specific performance of an oral
agreement to devise real property, or for money judgment for services rendered, materials and supplies furnished, and for improvements made.
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For many years, plaintiff had devoted much of his time to his
uncle's farming operation. After his marriage in 1945, plaintiff resided on the farm, receiving a monthly salary, but there is some
doubt that such wages were fully paid. His uncle then purchased
another farm which was leased to the plaintiff under the one-half
share crop basis, the uncle furnishing seed, farm machinery, and
paying all real and personal property taxes.
The plaintiff contends that in 1945 certain conversations were had
with the uncle whereby the latter stated that if plaintiff would stay
on the farm he could have it when he [the uncle] was through with
it, and to that end plaintiff continued to reside upon the farm under
the usual one-half crop contract and made many improvements
thereon. In addition the plaintiff and his wife furnished the uncle
with various meals, laundry, washing, and general care.
The uncle considered the plaintiff in the light of a son, paid practically all expenses in connection with the farming operation, and
although suffering to some extent from diabetes, was an able bodied
man in full possession of his faculties enabling him to carry on his
own farming operations, without the assistance of the plaintiff.
The court states that an oral agreement to devise real estate will
be specifically enforced, without reference to the Statute of Frauds,
where such a contract is established end the promisee has fully complied with the contract and compensation for services thereunder
cannot be computed in an action at law, and a denial of specific
performance would be a fraud upon the promisee. It further states
that North Dakota has approved the doctrine that a court of equity
will enforce an agreement to devise property after the death of the
promisor as against heirs, devisees, and personal representatives of
the deceased, provided the zgreement is fair, just, reasonable, and
based on adequate consideration. In addition the evidence must
be clear and convincing, and the parol contract must be clearly and
definitely established by greater certainty than in an action at law.
The court further states that where it appears that the promisee in
a contract of the kind under consideration occupies some peculiar
relation to the promisor because of the latter's physical or mental
condition the services performed were of a kind the value of which
could not be fairly estimated according to any peculiar standard,
the contract, whether oral or written, will be specifically enforced
if it is otherwise equitable.
Judge Heen in denying specific performance stated that the alleged agreement in the instant case related to labors of a joint farm-
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ing operation and did not pertain to personal care of the decedent
in any degree. Further, this court fails to ascertain that any of
plaintiff's acts are other than may be generally expected and actually
performed by the ordinary ambitious tenant, and it further appears
that such acts as performed by the plaintiff nephew in this respect
are not clearly referrable to the contract. Rather, it appears that
such services were furnished gratuitously and more because of
mutual love, affection, esteem, high regard, gratitude, and hope of
some future but undetermined reward than in performance of the
claimed contract.
As to the money judgment demanded, plaintiff has filed a claim
in the County Court in which the probate is pending. Since the
County Court has original exclusive jurisdiction to determine the
validity of claims against estates, the District Court has nq jurisdiction to pass upon validity (J claims other than in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
The decree of specific performance is denied.
WILLS -

PROOF NECESSARY TO SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT

Hagen v. Schlucher, Distrct Court of the Second Judicial District, Pembina County,
North Dakota, Douglas B. Heen, District Judge. (May 5, 1960).
TO MAKE RECIPROCAL AND MUTUAL WILLS. -

Plaintiff is the daughter of Adolph Steinbach and his first wife.
Defendant is the survivor of children born to Steinbach and his
second wife, Elizabeth. During the second marriage, a joint tenancy warranty deed was executed by Steinbach whereby the real
property in issue was deeded to himself and Elizabeth as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Subsequent to this, Adolph and
Elizabeth executed separate wills, which wills are similar and identical in provisions except for the 5th clause of each respective will
relating to encroachment or use of the properties for necessities of
the surviving spouse. Adolph preceded his wife in death, and thereafter she executed a contract for deed on the real estate in issue to
defendant. Elizabeth died several months later. The wills executed
by Adolph and Elizabeth divided the residue of the estate after the
death of the survivor to the plaintiff and the defendant in equal
amounts.
The plaintiff in this action contends that Adolph and Elizabeth
Steinbach pursuant to an oral contract during their lifetime executed
mutual wills containing provisions in favor of third parties, and that
upon the death of Adolph Steinbach, certain benefits were received
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by Elizabeth and that the latter by accepting such benefits made irrevocable the alleged compact created by such alleged oral contract and purported mutual wills. It is further contended that Elizabeth lacked authority to dispose of such real estate, and plaintiff is
thereby entitled to specific enforcement as a third party beneficiary
and the contracts for deed should be set aside.
The court states that a mutual will is one executed pursuant to a
compact or agreement by or between two or more persons to dispose of their property in a particular manner, each in consideration
of the other, and such compact or agreement, if in existance, is irrevocable and enforceable in equity. One line of decisions support
plaintiff's contention that wills containing reciprocal provisions are
in themselves proof sufficient to establish a compact. This court,
citing O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N.D. 346, 43 N.W.2d 649 (1950),
states: "Accordingly, it follows in this State that while such reciprocal provisions, while raising no presumption, are some evidence
of compact or agreement, yet the same is inconclusive and reference
must be had to the particular facts and circumstances of each case
to establish such contract, compact or agreement. And especially
is such examination of surrounding circumstances necessary where,
as in the instant case, no reference is made, or precatory language
employed, in the term of the wills to any compact or agreement."
The court goes on to say that the existance of separate wills, without clear and convincing evidence in addition, indicates ". . . nothing more than common life, mutual affection, common purposes,
and a common affection for third party beneficiaries".
"Such interpretation is consistent with the fact of the execution of
the joint tenancy deed by whch instrument title to the real property
upon death of Adolph vested immediately in Elizabeth, the survivor, and by virtue thereof Elizabeth was empowered to dispose
or encumber the property without the necessity of court order. .
The court found no contract to exist.
DIGEST OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
Novcmber 25, 1960
COUNTY AUDITOR - CONTRIBUTIONS OR TAXES
Is a county required to pay the taxes or contributions arising out
of the situation where the County Auditor accepts applications, processes same, transmits them to the State Hail Insurance Department
and is reimbursed by them for such work?

